In an article which has implications for the European Electronic Toll Service, ASECAP's Kallistratos Dionelis asks whether the approach we currently take to major ITS system implementations is always the best or healthiest. I was asked recently to write a paper on the technology-oriented future of transport. To paraphrase, I started with: "The goal of European policy-makers is to establish a transport system which meets society's economic, social and environmental needs, satisfying in parallel a rising dema
Dionelis: is the current way in which we formulate ITS legislation the correct one, or does ITS risk being forced to exist in a power vacuum? (Picture: ASECAP)
In an article which has implications for the European Electronic Toll Service,
As all authors should, I went back and reviewed my own words. I was horrified by the pomposity of something that was intended to be really quite earnest. My paper was full of common words and empty pseudo-visions which cover the page but in reality say nothing. Nothing was said about the realistic transport future, who will be the regulator, who will be the manager, when they will act, what they will do, how they will do it, with what cost and so on.
An over-inflated bunch of words and still the fundamentals (who, what, why, when, where, how and how much) remain unaddressed?
A time for words
If we are to talk about transport then our phrases must make sense to the citizen, the real driver, the 'sinner' who dares to buy a car and use it in order to move from A to B. If not, let us remain silent.In all professional transport papers, in every message, on every panel, the central message is always the same: "ITS is the means of efficient traffic management". Traffic management is now the panacea. When road infrastructure is not enough, when traffic is heavy, when congestion is high, when externalities exist, when safety becomes an issue, ITS appears as manna from heaven.
We talk about ITS management but nobody asks who will manage ITS.
All stop there. Nobody goes on to discuss what we should understand when stating that we need efficient transport management using ITS as a means to develop a cooperative transport environment. What is an intelligent vehicle, road, or driver? If there is so much 'intelligence' drifting around how, every day, at the same times, under the same conditions, do we end up with congestion? No-one discusses how we can create a market of cooperative systems where the various domains, all links in the long ITS value chain, will be ready to produce, consume, create added value, resell, re-consume and so on until we arrive at the end user who will be invited to 'buy' what the ITS value chain 'sells'.
The need for law
What do we need in order to move from various uncoordinated but intelligent links to a well-regulated intelligent chain? What do we need to move from fragmented intelligent transport stakeholders to the holistic approach of a really 'intelligent' transport system?Do we need laws? Yes. But what kind of laws? And how should these be prepared and adopted in a complex global market? The
The policy-makers within the Commission, Council and Parliament tried hard and had the best of intentions. They built a legal text with 13 articles and two annexes which, collectively, try to deal with ITS and its deployment. All of the extremely complex details are squeezed into the technical annexes: human-machine interfaces; nomadic devices; advanced driver support and information systems; secure parking information; ITS applications on open in-vehicle platforms; data exchange; information provision; intelligent traffic centres; intelligent infrastructure and so on. All ITS domains appear as simple titles.
In their closed-door discussions the public legislators have forgotten one thing: the market. This is surprising, because no-one ignores that within all these ITS visions and ITS deployment priorities it is the crucial factor. Industry players like to follow simple rules, examining the market framework, cost and characteristics of an ITS deployment product (to be finally produced and consumed at a certain quality and affordable cost which brings a profit to all).
First in their proposal is a definition of ITS: systems in which information and communication technologies are applied in the field of road transport (including infrastructure, vehicles and users) and traffic and mobility management, together with interfaces to other transport modes.
Of course, ITS is not just this definition. The Commission is advised by an ITS advisory group which is composed, in a rather chaotic way, of representatives from 'relevant' ITS service providers: associations of users, transport and facilities operators, manufacturing industry, social partners, professional associations, local authorities and other relevant groups.
Absence of authority
The Commission will have the delegated power to take actions, organise ITS gatherings, consult with the ITS market players, build action plans and convince the market stakeholders to commit to future ITS scenarios in which they will be prepared to start investing. But note the use of the term 'delegated power'; everything described in the ITS framework is practically worthless given that the European Parliament or Council can object to any decision of the Commission, even if such a decision may be the result of lengthy discussions with market stakeholders.My feeling is that no legal text, even the most 'perfect' one, can create a market reality if the right conditions and catalysts do not exist. We can of course regulate in a vacuum with theories but a market will only appear where stability, clarity, reliability and liability are present to diminish the risks, clarify the uncertainties, regulate, enforce the rules and, finally, structure a functioning, competitive environment. If these pre-conditions are absent no real ITS market players will ever appear to take action and the ITS domain will remain as in the past, full of lonely visionaries and researchers.
Dispelling distrust
Things are hard in the fast-changing ITS environment. The levels of ITS complexity to which market practitioners develop standards, specifications, economic models and risk management techniques are often too much for even the most sophisticated players to handle. I recognise that too often there is a wall between an organisation's information/technology departments and everything else. To put it simply: senior executives in both the public and private sectors still fail to recognise the general value of intelligent technologies. It is really a pity, given that in the transport sector ITS can help a company transform data from its operations, its business partners and its markets into useful, competitive and socially friendly information that can be a source of profitable innovation.Unavoidably, lack of ITS understanding has led policy-makers to suspect and distrust ITS market experts and players. The system risks remaining static or running out of control as a result. Political cabinets and public administrations, though solid and reliable, have no interest in including within themselves 'high-powered' ITS brains. These cabinets are staffed with political advisers who prefer to be deciders of big objectives. They are not 'details' people taking the real risks of drawing the mission lines connecting theories and dreams to business realities. In the private market 'managing' is a real beast, a matter of following mathematical models, detailed risk analyses, cost and benefits.
Designing the rules of the theoretical game can be time-consuming. But it is also easy, akin to playing Monopoly without real money. Creating a new market in the real world involves entering into a stormy world of uncertainty. When storms come, strong shelters are needed. Quick decisions are crucial. When market needs appear, much of the mist of formalities, policy-building sessions, committees, collegialities and 'democratic' consultations in open forums and platforms are perhaps unnecessary distractions given that effective decisions must be made by those who can be trusted to act swiftly and appropriately.
There is a real danger in thinking that definition of the business cases, economic scenarios for deployment and safeguards of an ITS system cannot include 'politically discredited' private-sector stakeholders. Typically, public-sector agencies face little risk in the decisions they take; their static, monolithic models struggle to find their way within the real world's labyrinthine and fast-changing markets.
My final question is a simple one: who gives those politicians who are happy to ignore the private sector special license to talk about economics and complex ITS technologies, and to take decisions without bearing the risk of consequences of possible failure? It is a really pity that, in the bras de fer between public and private, public never goes out of business...
