What can be done to preserve automated enforcement's reputation in the face of media and public criticism? Here, system manufacturers and suppliers talk about what they think are the most appropriate business models. Recent events in Italy only served to once again to push automated enforcement into the media spotlight. At the heart of the matter were the numerous alleged instances of local authorities and their contract suppliers of enforcement services colluding to illegally shorten amber signal phase tim
RSS
The affair became a national scandal. It led to Stefano Arrighetti, co-founder and President of83 Kria, the manufacturer of the enforcement systems which were at the heart of the alleged fraudulent practices, being placed under house arrest whilst investigations were ongoing. The situation also gave new life to the 'safety versus revenue' debate, with opponents of automated enforcement arguing that the balance had swung too far towards the latter. Enforcement equipment manufacturers, meanwhile, found themselves hostage to fortune: too often, it is the implementation methodology and not the equipment itself which is to blame for automated enforcement's 'failings'; nevertheless, perhaps as a consequence of being the visible 'face', it is the technology and not the policy which tends to become the focus of public criticism.
On pages 17-18 of ITS International's March-April 2009 edition, Arrighetti spoke to the international trade press for the first time since his release. In that interview, he called into question the practice, common in Italy, of awarding service providers a percentage of the revenues raised from fines generated. Arrighetti stated that such a business model effectively incentivised sharp practice and blurred the safety message. He argued that in order to avoid accusations of profiteering it would be better to have enforcement systems leased on a fixed-period and not a per-violation basis.
ITS International recently spoke to a series of equipment manufacturers in order to gauge which business models they feel are best suited to preserving enforcement's and their systems' collective reputation.
125 Sodi Scientifica.
"The Italian Parliament is currently approving a bill which will change many parts of our Road Code, so much of what we say here could become history soon," he notes. "The proposed bill states that enforcement equipment may be used by the police only through direct purchasing or bank leasing.
"The per-violation model allows the police to use equipment which make violators pay for improvements to road safety; on the other hand, if calculated as a percentage of the violation, it actually breaks current Italian laws. Giving private companies a share of public sector income leads to a conflict of interest. That conflict becomes more serious, and politicians' reactions more drastic, when levels of violations appear to be out of proportion to the size of the municipality and its historical patterns of enforcement.
"The law concerning the manner of acquisition by the police or civil service should have been more simply amended, also providing for fixed-rate leasing issued directly by the private party - manufacturer or dealer - and, in case of use of the per-violation method, setting a limit to the payment to the private party equal to the value of the capital of the products and services plus interest.
"It would be a good idea to set up a new agency in Italy, or to reinforce the existing ones, with something like the US's834 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which has as its mission to 'Save lives, prevent injuries and reduce economic costs due to road traffic crashes through education, research, safety standards and enforcement activity'. One of the new agency's tasks could be the management of procedures for approving signs, devices, equipment and technical control methods, and the coordination of local road safety bodies.
"But the most important reform should be that of speed limits and the criteria by which they are set. Currently in Italy, as in many other countries, there is a fixed limit for each kind of road, as defined in the Road Code itself. These limits' suitability has been repeatedly criticised. Since there is a need to reconcile traffic flow with road safety, the first thing to do would be to monitor flow on a road without limits and then set the limits on the basis of the top speed of 80-85 per cent of the vehicles - this is considered to be the behaviour of the 'careful driver'. Such a reform would: avoid the excesses which we have seen, with an abnormally high number of violations being issued in a fully legal manner but contrary to public opinion; effectively pursue a goal of road safety, as those who break the limit would truly be speeding; and satisfy the requirements of justice and the credibility of the civil service and of Italian law, since legal decisions are generally well accepted and respected by citizens as long as they are based on logical and rational criteria."
Looking further afield, geographic location tends to define the answer to the question of whether the per-violation business model remains valid. In Europe, the prevailing opinion is that the per-violation model is compromised, although measures can be put in place to offset accusations of profiteering. In the US, there is a greater disposition towards it.
112 Redflex's John Harris makes several distinctions according to location and market maturity but in developing markets where hands-on police enforcement is still the norm outsourcing will inevitably lead to the belief that the aim is financial gain, he says.
"Generally, when starting from a clean sheet, outsourcing will probably gain more public support where there is a mix of red light and speed solutions installed in locations with demonstrably poor accident rates or where there is the potential for significant errant driving.
"Per-violation models will remain and indeed probably grow in number, particularly in the US where mostly greenfield opportunities exist. In areas such as Europe with recognised practices and principals this is less likely. In new per-violation contracts, certificated equipment should be put in place and supported by police-approved procedural and operational practices which cannot be undermined by courtroom semantics. International certification authorities' influence is growing and this ensures that citations are only generated by proven, accredited equipment which applies the law evenly and fairly. Standard timings of red and green aspects also affect fairness and it is not only the enforcement equipment which needs to be certificated." Geoff Collins of126 Speed Check Services: "Many media commentators continue to push the idea that enforcement cameras are all about revenue raising or 'stealth' taxes. The belief is ingrained in most road users' minds and future enforcement developments must be unambiguous as to need and where any revenue will go. Per-violation payment is only credible and publicly acceptable if revenues aren't siphoned off - if payments are passed to a separate, ring-fenced fund clearly intended to improve road safety, then complaints of revenue-raising will reduce. If a camera owner or operator receives cash for each violation they are open to accusations of sharp practice regardless of how laudable their intentions. The measure of a successful road safety solution is one that reduces casualties and catches few people because offence levels are so low. If a camera operator earns higher revenues by issuing more tickets, isn't that an indication of failure? Provision of services to an agreed performance level is more appropriate going forward."
Peek's Martin de Vries agrees that it is better to contract based on agreed performance standards. Contracting against the number of violations charged means that the number of violations becomes a goal in itself, he adds.
"But several measures can be taken to make per-violation more palatable to the public. An independent assessor could report annually in an open report on services' integrity, efficiency and effectiveness. The defining metric should be safety on the stretches of road subject to the service: numbers of incidents, accidents, casualties and so on. Open communication about why, how and when enforcement is done can be part of this. In other words, the service should focus on changing road user behaviour and increasing safety."
South Africa faces several issues, not least an historically low level of fine payment. It has led service providers down the road of inventiveness, setting up roadblocks and even mobile court rooms in conjunction with local police. Rudi Gebert of143 Truvelo's response is perhaps based in part on pragmatism, therefore. He feels that it makes more sense for the local authority to enter into equipment rental/lease and maintenance agreements, the amount payable per month being fixed and not based upon a violation volume basis.
"Contracts must be able to be broken down so that the various identifiable sections such as equipment, maintenance, finance charges and service fees remain market related and can be audited and easily compared to other quotes/tenders," he says.
"The traffic authority can determine deployment locations based upon scientific accident data. The revenue generated from fines can now be utilised effectively by the government for road safety improvements or supplying other important infrastructure. Any road accident fund can be assisted with government funding."
2185 Robot/Jenoptic has recently pushed into the managed services sector, targeting emerging economies. Börries Lorenz-Meyer, the man responsible for directing that part of the company, is somewhat less unequivocal. In general, he feels, both types of remuneration scheme remain valid.
"However, close monitoring is vital to protect the intention of traffic law enforcement: improving road safety," he continues. "Standards have a role to play and where there are none, European or international, Robot/Jenoptic has set its own. We also recommend to clients that they contract with large, reputable specialists and avoid the use of very small local service providers.
"Overall transparency has to be the aim and Robot recommends a strong audit trail and certified equipment, people and processes. Where mobile enforcement is concerned it's vital to avoid direct payment at the roadside as the transparency of the paper and money trail must be maintained; only court-proof processes together with a tamper-proof evidence audit trial and secure transfer of payments will maintain or increase overall public acceptance."
James Tuton of US-based17 American Traffic Solutions also agrees that both violation models are feasible and credible.
"We follow customers' preferences and are willing to use either or a combination of the two," he continues. "Many communities prefer the per-violation model as a way with which to manage budgets by shifting the burden from taxpayers to violators. In contrast, some states require that related service fees are fixed and based on the services delivered. Yet other state laws prevent fees that are paid as a percentage of revenue or based on the number of paid citations.
"Transparency is the best safeguard against corruption and poor practices. The public and media will root out corruption and bad practices; they serve as the ultimate judge of a programme's validity. In any case, red light camera vendors cannot induce people to run red lights. A fee based on paid citations does however encourage the vendor to assist with the collection process."
"In the US, outsourcing models are very successful and prosecutions are fairly applied but market development was mostly based on the growth from red light infractions where errant drivers can clearly see they are guilty from the captured images. US enforcement is still in its infancy but there it is deemed quite acceptable in some jurisdictions for private organisations to not only fund the roadside and back office systems, but also the operational staff. Most responsible companies, however, have pushed for a strong police involvement to maintain and monitor operational practices and also to sign off the captured citations. As speed camera enforcement develops I would expect more objections and court challenges due to the increased numbers, increased local revenue and the not-so-obvious guilt on the collected images.
"In Europe, outsourcing is cutting-edge practice and is only now starting to be realistically considered. In the UK, outsourcing operations are just about to be sensibly considered and operational model business advice from the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Home Office will be forthcoming soon. The Republic of Ireland is just about ready to switch on a fully outsourced system, based on defined target hours worked at the roadside and very specific performance criteria. This system is typically speed enforcement-based. There will be no links whatsoever between infractions captured and payment for services.
"Some of the newer Eastern European countries have opted for rental or leasing of camera systems and back office facilities but are using their own police or local government staffs to operate them. The results of the fines credited within the system and the increases in safety help pay for the enforcement process, and in turn the monthly payments for the supplier's equipment. Arguably, only the guilty drivers fund such outsourced systems."
Geoff Collins makes a distinction between safety, if casualty reduction is the aim, and congestion charging schemes, where revenue generation is the goal. Clear water needs to be maintained between the two, he says, and he advocates a net benefit calculation based on casualty and congestion reduction savings.
Rudi Gebert agrees: "For as long as profits can be made by private organisations, there will always be a revenue-generation stigma attached to the partnership in the eyes of the motorist."
Martin de Vries and Börries Lorenz-Meyer also state that safety must be uncompromised.
"As soon as you try to apply a balance between the two, problems occur as in Italy and you lose public confidence," notes de Vries.
Lorenz-Meyer: "Financial penalties are only used to sustain awareness and driver discipline. International studies show that the risk of a given driver being involved in a fatal crash is 35 per cent lower during the month after receipt of a speeding ticket. The effect of deterrence on the driver's speed choice depends on the perceived risk and fear of being caught and of the resulting punishment."
James Tuton's response, meanwhile, challenges John Harris's perceptions of the US situation:
"Enforcement programmes are about safety. Revenue is simply a byproduct," Tuton states. "Fines are all voluntary, so it's not like a tax. If people don't want to pay, all they have to do is observe speed limits and stop on red."
According to John Harris, many systems should co-exist but eventually be harmonised and enforced cross-border.
"A safety-based model, where only the offenders pay for the system, should consist of a number of fixed-site cameras plus a number of portable and manned roadside systems, depending on the local safety problems, both to be measured by performance or a defined number of citations collected over an agreed time," he says.
"Payment by citation should be restricted to reduce system operator greed and mismanagement. Where payment by collected revenue or citation is already successfully practiced and operating efficiently, this should continue, with externally applied national standards brought in gradually to increase system specification and operational performance criteria to defined metrics, ensuring that any new entrants comply with acceptable and fair prosecution standards." Geoff Collins is less forgiving.
"I'm strongly against receiving payment that is related to the number of tickets issued," he states. "Why incentivise a supplier not to maximise the compliance/safety of a system? If I know a better way to improve compliance, I should be encouraged to deliver it rather than to leave in place an imperfect solution that generates offences above a certain level. Perhaps road authorities should consider paying additional bonuses to suppliers delivering a solution that exceeds key performance indicators unrelated to revenue."
It is essential to assess the situation country by country, says Martin de Vries: "In general, the trend is that private service organisations be responsible for maintaining the technical infrastructure, availability, quality of evidential material and so on. However the public authorities shall be responsible for the use of the systems. At the political level a balance must be found between investments in infrastructure safety, the cost of enforcement and the social cost of not doing any of this.
"Enforcement must always serve safety, be credible to the public and never become a de facto source of income. That doesn't mean that the public will always accept enforcement because people don't like to be controlled. One solution is to keep penalties low for mild infringements, those of 10 km/h or less over the posted limit, for instance, but be progressive when it comes to larger speed deviations and people who repeatedly drive badly. One of the biggest nuisances is paying repeated small penalties - say, less than €50 - where the speed lies only a few kilometres above the maximum. The better policy would be to increase the lowest speed trigger. Unfortunately, it is an open secret that the majority of the revenues from penalties come from small speed violations."
Börries Lorenz-Meyer notes that some countries - Germany, for example - do not allow per-violation remuneration in order to avoid potential conflicts of interest. In other countries, however, a risk-shared model is preferred to attract investment.
"In both cases, standards are necessary to protect the compliance of the service provider," he says.
To Rudi Gebert, the solution is to have private companies and individuals consult or offer their guidance to local authorities in order to improve the back office image and violation processing efficiency and throughput. The consultation/remuneration should be fixed per month and be project- or results-based.
"That way," he continues, "financial rental or leasing agreements together with equipment maintenance result in a fixed, per-month payment amount per month which is not linked to violation volumes. There is no investment in aging technology and the equipment maintenance, calibration and running costs are all known for the period agreed. When newer and better equipment comes along, a new lease or rental agreement can be entered into."
James Tuton offers the last comment.
"The business model in North America differs from that in Europe, where such programmes are typically operated by local police agencies. In most cases, the enforcement companies are technology vendors/providers, versus service companies that operate or manage programmes' operational aspects. While state-wide or national standards would be beneficial in some ways, the North American market will remain flexible and state and local governments will at least continue to have the option to choose a service model that makes best sense for them."
RSS
What can be done to preserve automated enforcement's reputation in the face of media and public criticism? Here, system manufacturers and suppliers talk about what they think are the most appropriate business models.
Recent events in Italy only served to once again to push automated enforcement into the media spotlight. At the heart of the matter were the numerous alleged instances of local authorities and their contract suppliers of enforcement services colluding to illegally shorten amber signal phase timings in order to dramatically increase the numbers of drivers committing 'offences' by running red lights; by doing so, the financial take from the much greater numbers of fines generated was also increased substantially.The affair became a national scandal. It led to Stefano Arrighetti, co-founder and President of
On pages 17-18 of ITS International's March-April 2009 edition, Arrighetti spoke to the international trade press for the first time since his release. In that interview, he called into question the practice, common in Italy, of awarding service providers a percentage of the revenues raised from fines generated. Arrighetti stated that such a business model effectively incentivised sharp practice and blurred the safety message. He argued that in order to avoid accusations of profiteering it would be better to have enforcement systems leased on a fixed-period and not a per-violation basis.
ITS International recently spoke to a series of equipment manufacturers in order to gauge which business models they feel are best suited to preserving enforcement's and their systems' collective reputation.
Business model validity
In Italy, which sparked the latest furore, changes are already afoot, says Paolo Sodi of"The Italian Parliament is currently approving a bill which will change many parts of our Road Code, so much of what we say here could become history soon," he notes. "The proposed bill states that enforcement equipment may be used by the police only through direct purchasing or bank leasing.
"The per-violation model allows the police to use equipment which make violators pay for improvements to road safety; on the other hand, if calculated as a percentage of the violation, it actually breaks current Italian laws. Giving private companies a share of public sector income leads to a conflict of interest. That conflict becomes more serious, and politicians' reactions more drastic, when levels of violations appear to be out of proportion to the size of the municipality and its historical patterns of enforcement.
"The law concerning the manner of acquisition by the police or civil service should have been more simply amended, also providing for fixed-rate leasing issued directly by the private party - manufacturer or dealer - and, in case of use of the per-violation method, setting a limit to the payment to the private party equal to the value of the capital of the products and services plus interest.
"It would be a good idea to set up a new agency in Italy, or to reinforce the existing ones, with something like the US's
"But the most important reform should be that of speed limits and the criteria by which they are set. Currently in Italy, as in many other countries, there is a fixed limit for each kind of road, as defined in the Road Code itself. These limits' suitability has been repeatedly criticised. Since there is a need to reconcile traffic flow with road safety, the first thing to do would be to monitor flow on a road without limits and then set the limits on the basis of the top speed of 80-85 per cent of the vehicles - this is considered to be the behaviour of the 'careful driver'. Such a reform would: avoid the excesses which we have seen, with an abnormally high number of violations being issued in a fully legal manner but contrary to public opinion; effectively pursue a goal of road safety, as those who break the limit would truly be speeding; and satisfy the requirements of justice and the credibility of the civil service and of Italian law, since legal decisions are generally well accepted and respected by citizens as long as they are based on logical and rational criteria."
Looking further afield, geographic location tends to define the answer to the question of whether the per-violation business model remains valid. In Europe, the prevailing opinion is that the per-violation model is compromised, although measures can be put in place to offset accusations of profiteering. In the US, there is a greater disposition towards it.
"Generally, when starting from a clean sheet, outsourcing will probably gain more public support where there is a mix of red light and speed solutions installed in locations with demonstrably poor accident rates or where there is the potential for significant errant driving.
"Per-violation models will remain and indeed probably grow in number, particularly in the US where mostly greenfield opportunities exist. In areas such as Europe with recognised practices and principals this is less likely. In new per-violation contracts, certificated equipment should be put in place and supported by police-approved procedural and operational practices which cannot be undermined by courtroom semantics. International certification authorities' influence is growing and this ensures that citations are only generated by proven, accredited equipment which applies the law evenly and fairly. Standard timings of red and green aspects also affect fairness and it is not only the enforcement equipment which needs to be certificated." Geoff Collins of
Peek's Martin de Vries agrees that it is better to contract based on agreed performance standards. Contracting against the number of violations charged means that the number of violations becomes a goal in itself, he adds.
"But several measures can be taken to make per-violation more palatable to the public. An independent assessor could report annually in an open report on services' integrity, efficiency and effectiveness. The defining metric should be safety on the stretches of road subject to the service: numbers of incidents, accidents, casualties and so on. Open communication about why, how and when enforcement is done can be part of this. In other words, the service should focus on changing road user behaviour and increasing safety."
South Africa faces several issues, not least an historically low level of fine payment. It has led service providers down the road of inventiveness, setting up roadblocks and even mobile court rooms in conjunction with local police. Rudi Gebert of
"Contracts must be able to be broken down so that the various identifiable sections such as equipment, maintenance, finance charges and service fees remain market related and can be audited and easily compared to other quotes/tenders," he says.
"The traffic authority can determine deployment locations based upon scientific accident data. The revenue generated from fines can now be utilised effectively by the government for road safety improvements or supplying other important infrastructure. Any road accident fund can be assisted with government funding."
"However, close monitoring is vital to protect the intention of traffic law enforcement: improving road safety," he continues. "Standards have a role to play and where there are none, European or international, Robot/Jenoptic has set its own. We also recommend to clients that they contract with large, reputable specialists and avoid the use of very small local service providers.
"Overall transparency has to be the aim and Robot recommends a strong audit trail and certified equipment, people and processes. Where mobile enforcement is concerned it's vital to avoid direct payment at the roadside as the transparency of the paper and money trail must be maintained; only court-proof processes together with a tamper-proof evidence audit trial and secure transfer of payments will maintain or increase overall public acceptance."
James Tuton of US-based
"We follow customers' preferences and are willing to use either or a combination of the two," he continues. "Many communities prefer the per-violation model as a way with which to manage budgets by shifting the burden from taxpayers to violators. In contrast, some states require that related service fees are fixed and based on the services delivered. Yet other state laws prevent fees that are paid as a percentage of revenue or based on the number of paid citations.
"Transparency is the best safeguard against corruption and poor practices. The public and media will root out corruption and bad practices; they serve as the ultimate judge of a programme's validity. In any case, red light camera vendors cannot induce people to run red lights. A fee based on paid citations does however encourage the vendor to assist with the collection process."
Safety and revenue: the balance
Regrettably, in John Harris's view, geography and historical development also drive perceptions of the correct balance between safety and revenue:"In the US, outsourcing models are very successful and prosecutions are fairly applied but market development was mostly based on the growth from red light infractions where errant drivers can clearly see they are guilty from the captured images. US enforcement is still in its infancy but there it is deemed quite acceptable in some jurisdictions for private organisations to not only fund the roadside and back office systems, but also the operational staff. Most responsible companies, however, have pushed for a strong police involvement to maintain and monitor operational practices and also to sign off the captured citations. As speed camera enforcement develops I would expect more objections and court challenges due to the increased numbers, increased local revenue and the not-so-obvious guilt on the collected images.
"In Europe, outsourcing is cutting-edge practice and is only now starting to be realistically considered. In the UK, outsourcing operations are just about to be sensibly considered and operational model business advice from the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Home Office will be forthcoming soon. The Republic of Ireland is just about ready to switch on a fully outsourced system, based on defined target hours worked at the roadside and very specific performance criteria. This system is typically speed enforcement-based. There will be no links whatsoever between infractions captured and payment for services.
"Some of the newer Eastern European countries have opted for rental or leasing of camera systems and back office facilities but are using their own police or local government staffs to operate them. The results of the fines credited within the system and the increases in safety help pay for the enforcement process, and in turn the monthly payments for the supplier's equipment. Arguably, only the guilty drivers fund such outsourced systems."
Geoff Collins makes a distinction between safety, if casualty reduction is the aim, and congestion charging schemes, where revenue generation is the goal. Clear water needs to be maintained between the two, he says, and he advocates a net benefit calculation based on casualty and congestion reduction savings.
Rudi Gebert agrees: "For as long as profits can be made by private organisations, there will always be a revenue-generation stigma attached to the partnership in the eyes of the motorist."
Martin de Vries and Börries Lorenz-Meyer also state that safety must be uncompromised.
"As soon as you try to apply a balance between the two, problems occur as in Italy and you lose public confidence," notes de Vries.
Lorenz-Meyer: "Financial penalties are only used to sustain awareness and driver discipline. International studies show that the risk of a given driver being involved in a fatal crash is 35 per cent lower during the month after receipt of a speeding ticket. The effect of deterrence on the driver's speed choice depends on the perceived risk and fear of being caught and of the resulting punishment."
James Tuton's response, meanwhile, challenges John Harris's perceptions of the US situation:
"Enforcement programmes are about safety. Revenue is simply a byproduct," Tuton states. "Fines are all voluntary, so it's not like a tax. If people don't want to pay, all they have to do is observe speed limits and stop on red."
Defining the ideal
Despite the sometimes sharp contrasts in opinion, there is agreement that a horses-for-courses attitude must be maintained - or, to put it another way, no one business model is ever likely to be universally popular or applicable.According to John Harris, many systems should co-exist but eventually be harmonised and enforced cross-border.
"A safety-based model, where only the offenders pay for the system, should consist of a number of fixed-site cameras plus a number of portable and manned roadside systems, depending on the local safety problems, both to be measured by performance or a defined number of citations collected over an agreed time," he says.
"Payment by citation should be restricted to reduce system operator greed and mismanagement. Where payment by collected revenue or citation is already successfully practiced and operating efficiently, this should continue, with externally applied national standards brought in gradually to increase system specification and operational performance criteria to defined metrics, ensuring that any new entrants comply with acceptable and fair prosecution standards." Geoff Collins is less forgiving.
"I'm strongly against receiving payment that is related to the number of tickets issued," he states. "Why incentivise a supplier not to maximise the compliance/safety of a system? If I know a better way to improve compliance, I should be encouraged to deliver it rather than to leave in place an imperfect solution that generates offences above a certain level. Perhaps road authorities should consider paying additional bonuses to suppliers delivering a solution that exceeds key performance indicators unrelated to revenue."
It is essential to assess the situation country by country, says Martin de Vries: "In general, the trend is that private service organisations be responsible for maintaining the technical infrastructure, availability, quality of evidential material and so on. However the public authorities shall be responsible for the use of the systems. At the political level a balance must be found between investments in infrastructure safety, the cost of enforcement and the social cost of not doing any of this.
"Enforcement must always serve safety, be credible to the public and never become a de facto source of income. That doesn't mean that the public will always accept enforcement because people don't like to be controlled. One solution is to keep penalties low for mild infringements, those of 10 km/h or less over the posted limit, for instance, but be progressive when it comes to larger speed deviations and people who repeatedly drive badly. One of the biggest nuisances is paying repeated small penalties - say, less than €50 - where the speed lies only a few kilometres above the maximum. The better policy would be to increase the lowest speed trigger. Unfortunately, it is an open secret that the majority of the revenues from penalties come from small speed violations."
Börries Lorenz-Meyer notes that some countries - Germany, for example - do not allow per-violation remuneration in order to avoid potential conflicts of interest. In other countries, however, a risk-shared model is preferred to attract investment.
"In both cases, standards are necessary to protect the compliance of the service provider," he says.
To Rudi Gebert, the solution is to have private companies and individuals consult or offer their guidance to local authorities in order to improve the back office image and violation processing efficiency and throughput. The consultation/remuneration should be fixed per month and be project- or results-based.
"That way," he continues, "financial rental or leasing agreements together with equipment maintenance result in a fixed, per-month payment amount per month which is not linked to violation volumes. There is no investment in aging technology and the equipment maintenance, calibration and running costs are all known for the period agreed. When newer and better equipment comes along, a new lease or rental agreement can be entered into."
James Tuton offers the last comment.
"The business model in North America differs from that in Europe, where such programmes are typically operated by local police agencies. In most cases, the enforcement companies are technology vendors/providers, versus service companies that operate or manage programmes' operational aspects. While state-wide or national standards would be beneficial in some ways, the North American market will remain flexible and state and local governments will at least continue to have the option to choose a service model that makes best sense for them."
RSS
